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Abstract. Galor discovered many mysteries of the growth process. He lists them in his 
Unified Growth Theory and wonders how they can be explained. Close inspection of his 
mysteries reveals that they are of his own creation. They do not exist. One of his claimed 
mysteries is the mystery of the alleged sudden spurt in the growth rate of income per capita 
and in the growth of population. This sudden spurt never happened. Precisely the same 
data, which were used in support of the Unified Growth Theory are in fact in its direct 
contradiction. They show that the created mysteries of growth do not exist. The difference 
between the diametrically opposite conclusions is that in order to support the Unified 
Growth Theory and to create the mysteries of growth data were appropriately manipulated 
and distorted but the contradicting evidence is based on their rigorous analysis. The 
mechanism of the historical economic growth and of the growth of human population is yet 
to be explained but it would be unproductive to try to look for explanations in the Unified 
Growth Theory. However, the problem is much deeper than just the examination of this 
theory. Demographic Growth Theory is based on the incorrect but deeply entrenched 
postulates developed by accretion over many years and now generally accepted in the 
economic and demographic research, postulates revolving around the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation and around a transition from stagnation to growth. The study 
presented here and earlier similar publications show that these postulates need to be 
replaced by interpretations based on the mathematical analysis of data and on the correct 
understanding of hyperbolic distributions. 
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1. Introduction 
n the subsection entitled ―Mysteries of the growth process‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 
220) presented in his Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011), Galor asks 
a series of questions about the mysteries of economic growth. We can take his 
questions one by one and show that all these mysteries were of his own creation.  
His theory isnot based on the scientific analysis of data but on impressions 
supported by the habitually distorted presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 
2005a, 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 
Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Such approach to research can 
easily create many mysteries that simply do not exist.  
One of Galor’s questions about the alleged mysteries of growth process is 
―What is the origin of the sudden spurt in growth rates of output per capita and 
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population that occurred in the course of the take-off from stagnation to growth?― 
(Galor, 2005a, p. 220).In just one sentence, Galor presents two incorrect doctrines: 
the doctrine of the presence of the sudden spurts and the doctrine of transition from 
stagnation to growth, both created by the failure to follow scientific principles of 
investigation, which require that data should not be manipulated to support 
preconceived ideas but that they should be methodically analysed.  
We shall show that this question makes as much sense as the question, ―Why 
does the sun rotate around the earth,‖ and the answer to both of them is similar: 
Thesun does not rotate around the earth and there was no sudden spurt in the 
growth rates of output per capita and population. There was also no takeoff from 
stagnation to growth because the growth was hyperbolic (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 
1993; Nielsen, 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). 
Hyperbolic growth is monotonic, and consequently it is also characterised by the 
monotonically-increasing growth rate. There is no sudden spurt in this type of 
distributions. These two doctrines expressed so confidently in just one sentence in 
Galor’s publication are incorrect. 
Output per capita (also described as income per capita and measured using the 
GDP/cap) is represented by the ratio of two, monotonically-increasing, hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2015). The growth rate of this ratio is monotonic.  It cannot 
contain ―the sudden spurt‖ claimed erroneously by Galor.  
Galor’s questions about the mysteries of growth are strongly misleading 
because they describe features created by the repeatedly distorted presentations of 
data. The created features and the associated questions divert attention from the 
correct understanding of the mechanism of economic growth and of the growth of 
population. Galor’s theory does not explain the mechanism of economic growth but 
describes phantom features he created.  
We have already discussed (Nielsen, 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d) 
various aspects of Galor’s theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011). We shall now focus our 
attention on the discussion of his unsubstantiated claims about the growth rates. 
We shall use precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used by Galor (2005a; 
2011), who unfortunately did not analyse them.  
Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect but it is just an embodiment 
of the incorrect concepts used traditionally in the economic and demographic 
research, concepts developed by accretion over many years and now so strongly 
entrenched that it will be probably difficult to uproot them and replace them by 
correct interpretations. However, it is expected that it is in the interest of every 
economist and demographer to have scientific basis for their research.  
These erroneous interpretations revolve around the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation and around the concept of transition from stagnation to growth. The 
study presented here and in earlier publications (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; 
Nielsen, 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d, 2016e; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975) 
demonstrate that these traditional interpretations need to be replaced by 
interpretations based on the mathematical analysis of data and on the correct 
understanding of hyperbolic distributions. 
The latest data of Maddison (2001; 2010) serve as a rich source of information. 
They are in perfect agreement with other similar data (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark, 
1968; Cook, 1960; Durand, 1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-
Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 
1975; Trager, 1994). When mathematically analysed, conclusions based on these 
dataare also in harmony with earlier similar studies (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; 
Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von 
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Hoerner, 1975). Their combined message is that the demographic and economic 
research has to be based on accepting the unambiguous and consistent evidence in 
data that the historical growth of human population and of economic growth were 
hyperbolic and that such a growth cannot be divided into two or three different 
regimes of growth governed by distinctly different mechanisms of growth. 
Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time and fast over a short time but it is still 
the same growth governed by the same mechanism of growth. Hyperbolic 
distributions have to be interpreted as a whole and not in parts. What appears as 
stagnation is hyperbolic growth and what appears as takeoff or explosion is the 
natural continuation of the same hyperbolic growth.   
 
2. Fundamental mathematics 
Growth rate ( )R S of a growing entity S can be defined as: 
 
1
( )
dS
R S
S dt
  ,                 (1) 
 
Where S can represent the GDP, the size of the population or any other growing 
entity. 
Let us assume that we have two growing entities 1S and 2S , and that we want to 
calculate the growth rate of the ratio of these two entities, i.e. the growth rate
1 2( )R S S . It is easy to see that 
 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
( )1
( ) ( ) ( )
d S S
R S S R S R S
S S dt
   .              (2) 
 
We have obtained an interesting equation: the growth rate of the ratio of two 
distributions is the difference between the growth rates of its two components. 
Thus, for instance, the growth rate of the GDP/cap is given by the difference 
between the growth rate of the GDP and the growth rate of population.  
If two growing entities increase monotonically (as it is in the case of the 
historical economic growth and of the historical growth of population) their growth 
rates also increase monotonically and consequently the growth rate of their ratio, 
which is represented by the difference between the monotonically-increasing 
growth rates of each of the two components, is also increasing monotonically. It 
does not contain a sudden spurt.  
Hyperbolic growth is described by the following simple differential equation: 
 
1 dS
kS
S dt
 ,                  (3) 
 
Where S can represent the GDP or the size of the population, or indeed any 
other hyperbolically-increasing entity, while k is a positive constant. 
If we compere this differential equation with the general definition of the 
growth rate given by the eqn (1) we can see that the characteristic feature of 
hyperbolic growth is that its growth rate is directly proportional to the size of the 
growing entity: 
 
( )R S kS .                   (4) 
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The growth rate of hyperbolic distributions increases hyperbolically. The time 
dependence of the growth rate of hyperbolic distributions creates precisely the 
same illusions as the time dependence of hyperbolic growth (Nielsen, 2014). The 
growth rate of hyperbolic distribution is slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time but it is a monotonically-increasing distribution, which cannot be divided into 
mathematically-justifiable slow and fast components because the transition from 
slow to fast growth occurs all the time along the entire time-range of such a 
distribution. The growth rate of hyperbolic growth does not contain any sudden 
spurt at any time. 
The equation (3) can be solved easily by substitution 1S Z . Its solution is: 
 
1
( )
S
a kt


,                   (5) 
 
Where a is a constant, which can be determined empirically by comparing the 
calculated curve with data. 
So, now, if we use the eqn (2) and if we assume that 1S and 2S are hyperbolic, 
then 
 
1
1 1
1
( )
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a k t


                 (6) 
and 
2
2 2
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
.                 (7) 
Consequently, by using the eqn (4) we have 
1
1
1 1
( )
k
R S
a k t


                 (8) 
and 
2
2
2 2
( )
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

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If we now use these expressions in the eqn (2) we shall get 
 
1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
( )
( )( )
k k
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a k t a k t a k t a k t

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where 
1 2 2 1k a k a   .               (11) 
 
The eqn (10) can be also presented as 
1 2 2
0 1 2
1
( / )R S S
A A t A t

 
 ,                    (12) 
 
where 
 
1 2
0
a a
A 

,                 (13) 
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1 2 2 1
1
k a k a
A

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
,                (14) 
1 2
2
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A 

.                 (15) 
 
So, while the growth rate of hyperbolic distributions is described by the 
reciprocal of a linear function [see the eqns (8) and (9)] the growth rate of the ratio 
of hyperbolic distributions is described by the reciprocal of the second-order 
polynomial [see the eqn (12)]. We could call it the second-order hyperbolic 
distribution. It is a distribution, which resembles closely the first-order hyperbolic 
distribution (the reciprocal of the linear function) because it also increases slowly 
over a long time and escapes to infinity at a fixed time. However, it is a 
monotonically-increasing distribution, which does not contain a sudden spurt. 
It obviously makes no sense to claim a sudden spurt in the monotonically 
changing second-order polynomial distribution and it obviously makes no sense to 
claim a sudden spurt in the reciprocal of the second-order polynomial. The sudden 
spurt can be created by distorting data, as Galor did, but then it is no longer 
science. Whether created on purpose to support preconceived ideas or carelessly, a 
similar distorted presentation of evidence would be unacceptable even outside 
science. However, distortion of evidence is not uncommon in defending doctrines 
accepted by faith. The distorted presentation of empirical evidence makes the 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011) scientifically unacceptable.  
Another way to understand that the growth rate of the ratio of two hyperbolic 
distributions (e.g. the growth rate of the GDP/cap distribution) cannot contain a 
sudden spurt is by looking at the denominator of the eqn (10), which is given by a 
product of two linearly decreasing functions. Multiplication of two linear 
distributions produces a monotonic distribution, which does not contain a sudden 
spurt.    
Had Galor analysed the data (Maddison, 2001) he was using, he would have 
perhaps found that the GDP and the size of the population were increasing 
hyperbolically. Maybe, then, it would have been clear to him that monotonic 
distributions cannot be characterised by the non-monotonic sudden spurts. Such an 
analysis should have been prompted by the discovery made over 50 years ago that 
the growth of human population during the AD era was hyperbolic (von Foerster, 
Mora &Amiot, 1960).This vital discovery, published in a well-known journal, is 
not even mentioned in Galor’s theory, maybe because it was an inconvenient 
discovery.  Such an analysis should have been also prompted by other related 
studies (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; 
von Hoerner, 1975). Finally, it should have been prompted by the data describing 
the historical growth of human population (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark, 1968; Cook, 
1960; Durand, 1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; 
McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 
1994). All these works have been ignored and a scientifically unreliable theory has 
been created with many mysteries of the growth process, mysteries that do not 
exist. 
As in the case of hyperbolic distributions which can be studied easily by 
investigating the reciprocal values of the size of the growing entity,  1/ S  (Nielsen, 
2014), an easy way to study the growth rate of the ratio of hyperbolic distributions 
is by using the reciprocal values of the growth rate, 1 21/ ( )R S S  . As 1/ S  converts 
the confusing hyperbolic distribution to a linear function, which is then easy to 
understand, so also the reciprocal values, 1 21/ ( )R S S , convert the second-order 
hyperbolic distribution into an easy-to-interpret second-order polynomial. In both 
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cases, the confusing features, which create the illusion of a slow growth over a long 
time followed by a sudden spurt disappear and are replaced by much simpler 
distributions.  
Confusing features of hyperbolic distributions can be also clarified by using 
semi logarithmic displays. Such displays are routinely used for distributions, which 
vary over a large range of values. We shall use them in our present discussion.  
 
3. World economic growth 
3.1. Growth of the GDP, population and income per capita (GDP/cap) 
According to Galor, historical economic growth is characterised by takeoffs 
from stagnation to growth, which occurred around AD 1750 for developed regions 
and around AD 1900 for less-developed regions (Galor, 2008a; 2012a). He 
describes them as ―stunning‖ or ―remarkable‖ escapes from the Malthusian trap 
(Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220). Such remarkable escapes should be readily 
identifiable in data describing economic growth and the growth of human 
population. In particular, for data describing the world economic growth and the 
growth of population, we should see clearly two takeoffs, around AD 1750 and 
around AD 1900.  
Results of our analysis of precisely the same data (Maddison, 2001) as used, but 
never analysed, by Galor during the formulation of the Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a; 2011), are presented in Figures 1-3. 
 
Figure 1.Data for the Gross Domestic Product (Maddison, 2001), precisely the same data 
as used but never analysed by Galor during the formulation of the Unified Growth Theory 
(2005a; 2011), are compared with the first-order hyperbolic distribution [eqn (5)]. The 
GDP is expressed in billions of 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. Parameters 
describing the fitted hyperbolic distribution are: 
21.716 10a   and 68.671 10k    
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Figure 2. Data describing the growth of the world population during the AD era 
(Maddison, 2001) are compared with hyperbolic distribution. The large discrepancy at AD 
1 is because of the maximum in the growth of the world population around that year 
associated with the transition from a fast-increasing hyperbolic distribution during the BC 
era to a slower hyperbolic distribution during the AD era (Nielsen, 2016b). Parameters 
describing the fitted hyperbolic distribution are 08.724 10a    and 34.267 10k    . 
 
The alleged takeoff from the assumed stagnation to growth for developed 
countries coincides with the onset of the Industrial Revolution, AD 1760-1840 
(Floud & McCloskey, 1994), which according to Galor was ―the prime engine of 
economic growth‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 212). It is, therefore, yet another reason why 
the takeoff for developed countries and the associated ―sudden spurt‖ in the growth 
rates should be easy to identify because the alleged prime engine should have been 
working most effectively in these countries. 
 
Figure 3.World income per capita (GDP/cap). Data (Maddison, 2001) are compared with 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 2015) representing the ratio of 
hyperbolic distributions of the GDP and of the size of population. Income per capita was 
increasing monotonically. Such monotonic increase cannot produce a non-monotonic 
growth rate claimed by Galor (2005a; 2011). It cannot produce “the sudden spurt in the 
growth rates of output per capita” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220). His “stunning” or 
“remarkable” takeoffs from stagnation to growth (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) did not 
happen. Industrial Revolution, the “prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 
212) had no impact on changing the economic-growth trajectory. All these stories are 
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contradicted by data (Maddison, 2001), precisely the same data as used but never analysed 
during the formulation of the Unified Growth Theory. 
 
Economic growth, as described by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shown in 
Figure 1, was hyperbolic. The alleged ―prime engine of economic growth‖ (Galor, 
2005a, p. 212) did nothing to change the growth trajectory. This is an interesting 
issue, which requires further investigation because technological discoveries were 
used to support economic growth but surprisingly perhaps they had absolutely no 
impact on changing the growth trajectory. It is as if economic growth was 
controlled by some other unknown and much stronger force, which was active 
before the Industrial Revolution and remained undisturbed during and after the 
Industrial Revolution. The alleged takeoffs from stagnation to growth did not 
happen because there was no stagnation. Economic growth was hyperbolic before 
and after the alleged takeoffs. The takeoffs claimed by Galor simply did not exist. 
The growth of population during the AD era, shown in Figure 2, was also 
hyperbolic, at least from around AD 1000, in perfect agreement with the discovery 
made over 50 years ago by von Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960). The discrepancy 
at AD 1 is explained by the analysis of the growth of human population in the past 
12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016b), which revealed a maximum around that year 
associated with the transition from a fast-increasing hyperbolic growth during the 
BC era to a slower hyperbolic growth during the AD era. This extended analysis 
demonstrated that there was an uninterrupted hyperbolic growth between 10,000 
BC and around 500 BC, followed by a transition to a new hyperbolic growth 
commencing around AD 500. It also revealed a small disturbance of the hyperbolic 
growth between AD 1200 and 1400. The data show that during the past 12,000 
years there was no stagnation and no sudden takeoff at any time, both in the growth 
of the population and in the growth rate. 
It is remarkable that so many independent studies are in such perfect agreement: 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and their analysis (Nielsen, 2014; 2015; 
2016a; 2016c; 2016d); the estimates of the size of human population not only 
during the AD era but also during the BC era (e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark, 1968; 
Cook, 1960; Durand, 1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 
1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; 
Trager, 1994) and their analysis (e.g. Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2016b; Kapitza, 
2006); the discovery made by von Foerster, Mora and Amiot (1960) and similar 
identifications of hyperbolic growth by Podlazov (2002), Shklovskii (1962; 2002) 
and von Hoerner (1975). 
In contrast, Unified Growth Theory and the generally accepted but questionable 
postulates used in the economic and demographic research describe events and 
processes occurring in the fictitious world characterised by Malthusian stagnation, 
takeoffs, sudden spurts and by the ―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escapes from the 
Malthusian traps (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220), the world which is entirely different 
than the world revealed by data and by their mathematical analysis.  
There appears to be no formal definition of Malthusian stagnation. Maybe some 
kind of stagnation can be used to describe social conditions but this concept is 
totally irrelevant in the study of the mechanism of economic growth and of the 
growth of human population because they were hyperbolic. There was no 
stagnation and no transition from the imagined stagnation to growth. Using such 
descriptions to explain the mechanism of the historical economic growth or the 
historical growth of population is unscientific because these postulates are 
consistently contradicted by data. 
Results of analysis of income per capita (GDP/cap) presented in Figure 3 also 
demonstrate a monotonically-increasing distribution at least from AD 1500, i.e. 
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during the time when Galor’s ―remarkable‖ and ―stunning‖ effects should be 
clearly visible. What is remarkable about this distribution is that nothing 
remarkable or stunning ever happened. The growth of the GDP/cap was 
remarkably stable. Industrial Revolution did not accelerate the growth of income 
per capita and there were no sudden takeoffs at any time.  
Such monotonically-increasing distributions, as presented in Figures 1-3, cannot 
generate ―the sudden spurt‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) in the corresponding growth 
rates and we shall now see that they indeed did not. 
3.2. Growth rates of the GDP, population and income per capita 
(GDP/cap) 
Results of analysis of growth rates are shown in Figures 4-6. Empirical growth 
rates were calculated using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) and interpolated 
gradients. The predicted growth rates were calculated using the fitted distributions 
shown in Figures 1-3. 
As expected, the growth rate of the world GDP and population were increasing 
monotonically. Industrial Revolution did not accelerate their growth. The 
―remarkable‖ or ―stunning‖ escapes from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220), which were supposed to have been reflected in takeoffs from stagnation 
to growth, never happened because there was no stagnation and the trap did not 
exist in the economic growth and in the growth of population. Growth rateswere 
increasing along remarkably robust trajectories. 
Analysis of growth rates shows a remarkable contradiction of Galor’s claims by 
precisely the same data, which he used, but never analysed, during the formulation 
of his Unified Growth Theory. His wished-for and claimed features never 
happened. Growth rates were increasing monotonically. There was absolutely no 
sudden spurt at any time. 
In order to support his preconceived ideas, Galor ignored not only the analysis 
carried out over 50 years ago (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960) but also 
research contributions of his many other predecessors (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; 
Cook,1960; Durand, 1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 1990; Haub, 1995; Kapitza, 2006; 
Kremer, 1993; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Podlazov, 2002; 
Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 
1994; von Hoerner, 1975). Galor’s claims are in conflict with science. They are not 
just unsupported by science – they are repeatedly contradicted by the scientific 
analysis of data and most notably by the analysis of precisely the same data, which 
he used during the formulation of his theory. 
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Figure 4.Growth rate of the world GDP was increasing monotonically. There was no 
sudden spurt. The claimed takeoffs did not happen. Industrial Revolution did not accelerate 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 5.Growth rate of the world population. Empirical growth rate calculated using 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) and interpolated gradients is compared with the 
predicted growth rate calculated using parameters of the fitted hyperbolic distribution 
displayed in Figure 2. Galor’s claims (Galor, 2005a; 2011) are remarkably contradicted 
by the analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), precisely the same data, which he 
used but never properly analysed. Galor’s mystery of “the sudden spurt” in the growth rate 
of population (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) is solved – there was no sudden spurt. 
 
 
Figure 6.Growth rate of the world income per capita (GDP/cap).Empirical growth rate 
calculated using Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) and interpolated gradients is 
compared with the predicted growth rate calculated using parameters of the fitted 
hyperbolic distributions displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Galor’s claims (Galor, 2005a; 2011) 
are remarkably contradicted by the analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), 
precisely the same data, which he used but never properly analysed. Galor’s mystery of 
“the sudden spurt” in the growth rate of income per capita (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) is solved 
– there was no sudden spurt. 
 
Mathematical analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), precisely the 
same data as used by Galor, solves also his mystery ―of the sudden spurt in growth 
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rates of output per capita‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 220) – there was no spurt. Results of 
analysis are presented in Figure 6. Growth rate of income per capita (GDP/cap) 
was increasing monotonically. Industrial Revolution did not accelerate the growth 
of income per capita. The postulated takeoffs from stagnation to growth (yet 
another mystery of growth claimed by Galor) did not happen because there was no 
stagnation and because the growth rate was increasing steadily without any major 
interruption. The only real mystery is why the growth rate of income per capita was 
so remarkably stable over such a long time.  
Hyperbolic distributions, which increase monotonically, are characterised by 
monotonically-increasing growth rates, as shown in Figures 5-6. Claiming the 
existence of sudden spurts in such distributions is scientifically unjustifiable. Going 
a step further and claiming that such an imaginary spurt is a mystery, which needs 
to be explained encourages other researchers to carry out pointless and 
unproductive research. 
It is useful to compare the mathematical analysis of Maddison’s data presented 
in Figure 6 with the distorted presentation used by Galor reproduced in Figure 7. 
Both figures are based on precisely the same set of data (Maddison, 2001). The 
contrast is striking. Now we can better appreciate the lack of scientific support for 
his theory. It is surprising that his theory was ever published. It is also surprising 
that similar distorted diagrams and the associated unscientific claims and 
explanation were published in peer-reviewed literature (Galor, 2005b; 2007; 2010; 
2011; 2012b; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) 
While data and their analysis, displayed in Figure 6, present monotonically-
increasing growth rate of income per capita, Galor’s distorted presentation of 
precisely the same data show a clear ―sudden spurt.‖ Maybe Galor was so strongly 
guided by the traditional interpretations of economic growth that he could not 
accept the clear contradicting evidence or maybe he simply did not know how to 
analyse data. In any case, intentional or unintentional, such ubiquitous distorted 
diagrams used repeatedly in his theory can be hardly expected to lead to reliable 
conclusions. On the contrary, they can be expected to lead only to incorrect 
conclusions.  
 
Figure 7.Galor’s distorted, strongly suggestive and misleading presentation of Maddison’s 
data (Maddison, 2001) describing the growth rate of output (income) per capita (Galor, 
2005a,  p. 179). Precisely the same data, when correctly displayed and analysed (see 
Figure 6), show that” the sudden spurt in the growth rate of output per capita” claimed by 
Galor (2005a, p. 220) did not exist. 
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Galor gives also many isolated examples of small growth rates in the past and 
significantly larger values at a later stage of growth but all these examples are not 
only meaningless but also strongly misleading. They reflect nothing more than just 
the natural properties of hyperbolic distributions. Using them to prove stagnation 
and transitions from stagnation to growth is scientifically irresponsible. 
Of course growth rates of income per capita (GDP/cap) were small over a long 
time and significantly larger at a certain later stage of growth because they were 
following monotonically-increasing second-order hyperbolic distributions [see eqn 
(12)]. Hyperbolic distributions (second-order or first-order) are slow over a long 
time and fast over a short time but they are still the same, monotonically-increasing 
distributions. They are not characterised by sudden spurts. There is no profound 
mystery about them that needs to be explained by some elaborate research or 
mathematical formulations. It is just a simple and straightforward hyperbolic 
growth. The mystery is solved.  Picking up some isolated numbers from such 
hyperbolic distributions and drawing some profound conclusions based on such 
examples is unscientific. The only mystery that needs to be explained is why the 
economic growth and the growth of population were hyperbolic and why they were 
so remarkably stable (undisturbed) over such a long time. 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
Galor discovered many ―mysteries of the growth process‖ (Galor, 2005a, p. 
220). One of his mysteries is ―the sudden spurt in growth rates of output per capita 
and population that occurred in the course of the take-off from stagnation to 
growth― (Galor, 2005a, p. 220).  
His discoveries are based on the crude and distorted presentations of data 
(Ashraf, 2009; Galor; 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 
2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). His 
mysteries are of his own creation.  They do not need to be explained because they 
do not exist. They describe the world of fiction. 
Historical economic growth and the growth of human population were 
hyperbolic (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 
2016d; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 
1960; von Hoerner, 1975). Hyperbolic distributions are monotonic and they are 
characterised by the monotonically-increasing growth rates. Sudden spurts do not 
exist in such distributions. 
It is essential to understand that it is incorrect to take a slowly-increasing 
distribution and automatically claim the evidence of Malthusian stagnation. The 
state of stagnation might occur when there is a strong interference between a 
primary force propelling growth and some random opposing forces. Effects of 
stagnation should be reflected in the growth trajectory, which should be clearly 
unstable. If the growth follows a steadily-increasing trajectory without any clear 
signs of random behaviour, then there is no need to complicate the description of 
the mechanism of growth by introducing random forces whose presence is 
undetectable. The fundamental principle of scientific investigation is to look for the 
simplest descriptions and explanations. Introducing unnecessary complications is 
simply unscientific. 
It appears that the established knowledge in demography and in economic 
research is strongly based on a series of postulates revolving around the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation and around the alleged transition from the imagined 
stagnation to growth. Complicated mechanisms and interactions are then used (and 
gradually made even more complicated) to explain the mechanism of growth. 
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Galor went one step further and reinforced these incorrect interpretations by his 
persistently distorted presentations of data (such as shown in Figure 7) and by his 
repeated quotations of certain well-selected figures to support his preconceived 
ideas, figures which were supposed to illustrate the concepts of stagnation and 
takeoffs from stagnation to growth but when closely analysed illustrate nothing 
else than the simple hyperbolic growth. All such complicated explanations are 
contradicted by data. Close examination of data shows that there was no stagnation 
and no transition from stagnation to growth. Data show consistently that the 
mechanism of the economic growth and of the growth of human population must 
have been simple because hyperbolic growth is exceptionally simple [see eqn (5)]. 
Some types of growth might be slow and stagnant but hyperbolic growth is not 
stagnant even when it is slow. It is prompted by the same mechanism during the 
time when it is slow and when it is fast. If the mechanism of Malthusian stagnation 
is used to explain the slow hyperbolic growth, precisely the same mechanism 
should be used to explain the fast growth, which is commonly described as 
explosion. It is incorrect to divide hyperbolic distributions into two or three 
sections and assign different mechanisms of growth to each of such arbitrarily 
selected sections. Hyperbolic distributions have to be explained as a whole and the 
same mechanism should be applied to the apparent slow and to the apparent fast 
sections. 
It is incorrect to take a hyperbolic distribution and look for a sudden takeoff 
from the imagined stagnation to growth, as Galor did repeatedly. It is impossible to 
divide hyperbolic distribution into such distinctly different sections and the best 
way to see it, is by using the reciprocal values (Nielsen, 2014) because hyperbolic 
distribution is then represented by a decreasing straight line and it is obvious that it 
is impossible to claim a change of direction on the straight, which shows no change 
of direction. 
Hyperbolic growth is not the only type of growth that can be slow over a certain 
time but not stagnant. Exponential growth is initially slow but it gradually becomes 
faster. At a certain stage, as if suddenly, it becomes overwhelmingly fast, the effect 
described as ―the second half of the chessboard‖ (Kurzweil, 1999). Logistic growth 
is also initially slow but it is not stagnant.  
The difference between hyperbolic and exponential distributions is that for 
hyperbolic distributions the apparent (but non-existent) transition from a slow to 
fast growth is more clearly articulated. That is why hyperbolic distributions are so 
often misinterpreted, particularly if they are distorted as it is done repeatedly and 
persistently in Galor’s publications. However, this apparent transition from slow to 
fast growth does not happen at any given time or even over a certain specific range 
of time. It happens all the time. The acceleration is gradual along the entire range 
of hyperbolic distribution.  
Growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) is represented by the ratio of two 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2015). The ratio of monotonically increasing- 
distributions is characterised by the monotonically-increasing growth rate. We have 
shown that while the growth rate of the GDP and population increases 
hyperbolically, the growth rate of income per capita (GDP/cap) increases by 
following a second-order hyperbolic distribution (the reciprocal of the second order 
polynomial). There is no sudden spurt in any of these distributions and we have 
demonstrated this point by using the world economic growth and the growth of 
human population.   
When doctrines accepted by faith are defended, scientific rules of engagement 
are readily violated. Contradicting data are then either ignored or manipulated to 
support preconceived ideas. Economic and demographic research has no place for 
this type of activities. However, intentionally or unintentionally, such unscientific 
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approach to research appears to have been adopted during the formulation of the 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a; 2011). Numerous preceding research works 
(e.g. Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand,1967; 1974; 1977; Gallant, 
1990; Haub, 1995; Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Livi-Bacci, 1997; McEvedy & 
Jones, 1978; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962; 2002; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; 
Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 
1975) were ignored and the excellent data of Maddison (2001) were manipulated 
and distorted to support a series of preconceived ideas.  
Hyperbolic distributions may be confusing but there is no excuse for distorting 
them to make them even more confusing. There is also no excuse for failing to 
analyse hyperbolic distributions because their analysis is trivially simple (Nielsen, 
2014). The analysis of the growth rates is in the same category. Graphically, all 
these distributions become abundantly clear by using either the semi logarithmic 
scales of reference of by displaying the reciprocal values of growing entities or of 
their corresponding growth rates.  
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is scientifically unacceptable and so are also 
many traditional interpretations of economic growth and of the growth of human 
population, interpretations based on the incorrect understanding of the 
mathematical properties of hyperbolic distributions. The recent and readily-
accessible Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001; 2010) make it now easy to study the 
mechanism of the historical economic growth and of the growth of human 
population. They demonstrate that certain fundamental postulates revolving around 
the concept of Malthusian stagnation and around the assumed transition from the 
non-existent stagnation to growth, still used routinely in the established knowledge 
in demography and in economic research, are no longer acceptable. 
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